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November 14 , 1986 
TO CALL WRITER DIRECT 
8 0 1 - 5 3 0 -
Re: American Salt v. Hatch 
Case No. 860048 
Our reference: 03245.005 
Dear Geoff: 
Oral argument was held in the above referenced case on November 
12th of this year. Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (1985). I am writing this letter to set forth 
supplemental citations which support the arguments American Salt made 
at oral argument. 
At oral argument, American Salt argued that the 15 cases cited by-
Hatch (interpreting Federal, Colorado and Illinois law concerning 
tariffs generally) were inapplicable to this case. The remedy American 
Salt seeks is an order of reparations from the Public Service 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20. The remedy of reparations 
under Federal law, Colorado law, Illinois law and Utah law is a remedy 
that can be ordered only by the administrative commission with 
jurisdiction over the particular case. Since none of the cases cited 
by Hatch are appeals from the administrative commission of the 
jurisdiction involved, the dissatisfied shippers in those cases could 
not procedurally seek the remedy of reparations. 
Geoffrey Butler 
November 14, 1986 
Page 2 
The following citations support this argument: 
1. 49 U.S.C. 304a (as amended 1965; repealed 1978) -- the Federal 
reparations statute under the Interstate Commerce Act. A copy of 
the statute as shown in Pub. Law 89-170, § 6, 79 Stat. 651 (Sept. 
6, 1965) is attached as Exhibit A. 
2. The following cases interpret § 304a as amended in 1965: 
A. Western Transportation Company v. Wilson and Company, 
Inc., 682 F.2d 1287, 1231 (7th Cir. 1982). 
B. Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 491 
F.2d 1082, 1084-1085 (5th Cir. 1974). 
C. United States v. Associated Transport, Inc., 505 F.2d 
366, 368-369 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
3. 111. Rev. Stat., ch. Ill 2/3, § 9-252 (1983) -- the Illinois 
reparation statute (previously codified as 111. Rev. Stat., ch. Ill 
2/3, par. 76. (1943)) A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit 
B. 
4. Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, 340 N.E.2d 98, 
102, 34 111. App. 3d 448 (1st Dist. App. Ct. 1975) -- interpreting 
the Illinois reparation statute. A copy of the case is attached as 
Exhibit C. 
5. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-119 (1963) -- the Colorado reparation 
statute. A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit D. 
6. Bonfils v. Public Utilities Commission, 189 P. 775, 780 (Colo. 
1920) -- interpreting the predecessor reparation's statute in 
Colorado. 
I am enclosing the original of this letter and ten copies. I would 
appreciate your filing this letter with the Court for its consideration. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely yours. 
Charles M. Bennext 
CMB:wps 
Enclosures 
cc: Merlin O. Baker (w/encl.) 
CDN4313B 
79 STAT. ] PUBLIC LAW 89-170-SEPT. 6, 1965 651 
enforce obedience thereto by a writ of injunction or by other process, 
mandatory or otherwise, restraining such person, his or its officers, 
agents, employees, and representatives from further violation of such 
section or of such rule, regulation, requirement, or order; and enjoin-
ing upon it or them obedience thereto. A copy of any application for 
relief filed pursuant to this paragraph shall oe served upon the Com-
mission and a certificate of such service shall appear in such applica-
tion. The Commission may appear as of right in any such action. 
The party who or which prevails in any such action may, in the 
discretion of the court, recover reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed 
by the court, in addition to any costs allowable under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff instituting such action shall be 
required to give security, in such sum as the court deems proper, to 
protect the interests of the party or parties against whom any tem-
porary restraining order, temporary injunctive or other process is 
issued should it later be proven unwarranted by the facts and 
circumstances. 
"(3) In any action brought under paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
the Commission may notify the district court of the United States in 
which such action is pending that it intends to consider the matter in a 
proceeding before the Commission. Upon the filing of such a notice 
the court shall stay further action pending disposition of the proceed-
ing before the Commission." 
SEC. 6. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 204a of the Interstate Com- r^^lndl^?-*' 
merce Act (49 U.S.C. 304a) is amended to read as follows: charges. 
"(2) For recovery of reparations, action at law shall be begun 63 Stat' 280, 
against common carriers by motor vehicle subject to this part within 
two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and 
for recovery of overcharges, action at law shall be be^un against com-
mon carriers by motor vehicle subject to this part within three years 
from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, subject to 
paragraph (3) of this section, except that if claim for the overcharge 
has been presented in writing to the carrier within the three-year 
period of limitation said period shall be extended to include six months 
from the time notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant 
of disallowance of the claim, or any part or parts thereof, specified 
in the notice/' 
(b) Section 204a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 304a) J\^\^1/ 
is amended by redesignating paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) as para-
graphs (6), (*7), and (8), respectively, and by inserting immediately 
after paragraph (4) thereof the following: 
"(5) The term 'reparations* as used in this section means damages 4,Re?a"a*~S-M 
resulting from charges for transportation services to the extent that 
the Commission, upon complaint made as provided in section 216(e) 
of this part, finds them to have been unjust and unreasonable, or *l^fc !ie' 
unjustlv discriminatory or unduly preferential or unduly prejudicial." 
SEC. Y. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 406a of the Interstate Com-
merce Act (49 L .^S.C. 1006a) is amended to read as follows: T Z ^ ^ ^ C 8 2 ' 
"(2) For recovery of reparations, action at law shall be begun 
against freight forwarders subject to this part within two years from 
the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and for recovery 
of overcharges, action at law shall be begun against freight for-
warders subject to this part within three years from the time the cause 
652 PUBLIC LAW 89-170-SEPT. 6, 1965 [79 STAT. 
of action accrues, and not after, subject to paragraph (3) of this sec-
tion, except that if claim for the overcharge has been presented in 
writing to the freight forwarder within the three-year period of limi-
tation said pericd shall be extended to include six months from the 
time notice in writing is given In the freight forwarder to the claimant 
of disallowance of the claim, or any part or parts thereof, specified 
in the notice/* 
(b) Section 4(>6a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 1006a) 
is amended by redesignating paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) as para-
graphs (6). (7), and (S), respectively, and by inserting immediately 
after paragraph (4) thereof the following: 
"Reparations." "(5) The term 'reparations' as used in this section means damages 
resulting from charges for transportation services to the extent that the 
Commission, upon complaint made as provided in section 406 of this 
49 use i2oo86 part) finds them to have been unjust and unreasonable, or unjustly 
discriminatory or unduly preferential or unduly prejudicial/* 
49 use 9oi9-923 ^EC. 8# ^ P a r t ^ o f t h e I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Act is amended by 
inserting immediately after section 312 the following new section : 
"REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATES \ND PERMITS 
"SEC. 312a. (1) Certificates and permits shall be effective from the 
date specified therein, and shall remain in effect until suspended or 
revoked as provided in this section. 
"(2) Any certificate or permit issued under this part may, upon 
application of the holder thereof, in the discretion of the Commission, 
be amended or revoked, in whole or in part, or mav, upon complaint, or 
on the Commission's own initiative, after reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing, be suspended, changed, or revoked, in whole or in 
49 use 905. part, for willful failure to comply with the provisions of section 305(a) 
with respect to performing, providing, ana furnishing transportation 
upon reasonable request therefor: Provided, however, That no such 
certificate or permit shall be suspended, changed, or revoked under 
this paragraph (except upon application of the holder) unless the 
holder thereof, fails to comply, within a reasonable time, not less than 
thirty days, to be fixed by the Commission, with a lawful order of the 
49 use 904. Commission, made as provided in section 304 (e) of this title, command-
ing obedience to the provisions of section 305(a) with respect to per-
forming, providing, and furnishing transportation upon reasonable 
request therefor." 
(b) The table of contents in section 301 of the Interstate Commerce 
Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 901), is amended by inserting immediately 
after and below 
"Sec. 312. Transfer of <t»rtitUates and permits 
the following: 
"Set*. HVM\. R<*\<Narioii uf <vrtitic;ite> inul i*rihir* '. 
Approved September 6. 1965. 
54 Sta* ^34 
49 USC 905 
9-252. Excessive or unjust rate or charfe—Refund to customer—Actions to 
recover damages—Cumulative remedy 
§ $-252 When complaint is made to the Commission concerning any rate or 
other charge of any public utility and the Commission finds, after a hearing, that the 
public utility has charged an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for its 
product, commodity or service, the Commission may order that the public utility 
make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest at the legal rate from 
the date of payment of such excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount 
When a customer pays a bill as submitted by a public utility and the billing is later 
found to be incorrect due to an error either in charging more than the published rate 
or m measuring the quantity or volume of service provided, the utility shall refund 
the overcharge with interest from the date of overpayment at the legal rate or at a 
rate prescribed by rule of the Commission Refundis and interest for such overc-
harges may be paid by the utility without the need for a hearing and order of the 
Commission 
If the public utility does not comply with an order of the Commission for the 
payment of money within the time fixed in such order, the complainant, or any 
person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in a circuit court of 
competent jurisdiction a complaint setting forth briefly the causes for which the 
person claims damages and the order of the Commission in the premises Such 
action shall proceed in all respects like other civil actions for damages, except that on 
the trial of such action the order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of 
the facts therein stated If the plaintiff shall finally prevail, he or she shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of 
the action 
All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission 
within 2 years from the time the produce, commodity or service as to which 
complaint is made was furnished or performed, and a petition for the enforcement of 
an order of the Commission for the payment of money shall be filed m the proper 
court within one year from the date of the order, except that if an appeal is taken 
from the order of the Commission, the time from the taking of the aopeal until its 
final adjudication shall be excluded in computing the one year allowed for filing the 
complaint to enforce such order 
The remedy provided in this section shall be cumulative, and in addition to any 
other remedy or remedies in this Act provided in case of failure of a public utility to 
obey a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission 
Uws 1921, p 702, § 9-252, added by PA 84-617, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1986 
Uws 1943 vol 1, p 1037 § 1 
PA 81-1007 § 1 
P A 83-345 § 69 
PA 83-629 § 1 
PA 83-1362, Art II, § 124 










497 § 72 
702, art V, 
509, § 1 
1093, § 1 
§72 
ARTICLE X PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION AND THE COLRTS [NEW] 
10-101. Investigations and hearings 
§ 10-101 The Commission, or any commissioner or hearing examiner designated 
by the Commission, shall have power to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings 
concerning any matters covered by the provisions of this Act, or by any other Acts 
relating to public utilities subject to such rules and regulations as the Commission 
ma> establish In the conduct of any investigation, inquiry or hearing the provisions 
of The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act,1 including but not limited to Sections 
10 and 11 of that Act,2 shall be applicable and the Commission's rules shall be 
consistent therewith Complaint cases initiated pursuant to any Section of this Act, 
investigative proceedings and ratemaking cases shall be considered "contested 
cases" as defined in Section 3 02 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act,3 any 
contrary provision therein notwithstanding Any proceeding intended to lead to the 
establishment of policies, practices rules or programs applicable to more than one 
utility may, in the Commission's discretion, be conducted pursuant to either rulemak 
151 
Exhibit C 
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been discovered prior to trial by the exer-
cise of due diligence, or at least in the one 
and one-half months following the trial, if 
in fact it was available. It should be noted 
that witness Heard was listed on the list of 
witnesses furnished to the defendant be-
fore trial. Again we observe that if the 
information referred to had been obtained, 
if admissible it could have impeached the 
testimony of Heard. However, the evi-
dence as to the beating of the deceased by 
the defendant was from witnesses other 
than Heard. Therefore the new evidence 
was not of such a conclusive character that 
would probably change the result of the 
trial. We believe the action of the trial 
court in denying the offer of proof was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
After the sentencing hearing the court 
imposed a sentence of 20 to 40 years im-
prisonment which is within the proscribed 
statutory recommendations for the crime 
of murder under both the new and old 
statute. We have held that the trial court 
is given a great deal of discretion in sen-
tencing and its decision should not be re-
versed or reduced unless there is substan-
tial reason for doing so. (People v. Bell 
(1st Dist. 1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 130, 309 N. 
E.2d 344.) Considering the nature and cir-
cumstances of the crime, we find no sub-
stantial reason to reduce the sentence. 
The judgment and sentence of the circuit 
court of Cook County are affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
STAMOS and LEIGHTON, JJ., con-
cur. 
[12] The final issue raised by the de-
fendant is that the sentence imposed by the 
court was excessive. Prior to sentencing 
the court considered a presentence report 
concerning the defendant which consisted 
of a personal history including social con-
ditions surrounding the defendant's life. 
A hearing in aggravation and mitigation 
was conducted in accordance with the 
Unified Code of Corrections. (Ill.Rev. 
Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-4-1.) In 
addition the trial court asked defendant's 
counsel to explain the differences to the 
defendant between being sentenced under 
the old and new statute. Prior to January 
1, 1973 the statute in Illinois provided that 
a person convicted of murder shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment with a minimum of 
not less than 14 years. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, 
ch. 38, par. 9-1.) After January 1, 1973 
the statute provided for a minimum of "14 
\ears unless the court, having regard to 
the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense and the history and character of the 
defendant, sets a higher minimum term;" 
plus a parole term of 5 years. (Ill.Rev. 
Stat.1973, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8-1 (c)(1) and 
(e)(1).) Defendant elected to be sen-
tenced under the old statute. 
(O | KEY KUMKI SYSTIM> 
34 Ill.App.3d 448 
Sol I. DVORKIN, Individually and on hit 
own behalf and on behalf of all the class of 
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPA-
NY, an Illinois Corporation, and America! 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, a cor-
poration, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 59063. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Third Division. 
Nov. 20, 1975. 
Action was brought by plaintiff on his* 
own behalf and on behalf of class alleging 
that telephone compan\'s policy and prac-
tice in providing sen :ces for personal use 
of current, former and retired officers, di-
rectors and employees either without* 
charge or at less than established rates viod 
DVORKIN v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY 
Cite as 340 N.E.2d 98 
111. 99 
.ated Public Utilities Act. The Circuit 
Court, Cook County, Charles R. Barrett, J., 
granted telephone company's motion to 
strike complaint and dismiss suit for want 
oi jurisdiction, and plaintiff appealed. 
The Appellate Court, Mejda, J., held that 
complaint which was not for penalties but 
:or refunds as damages or reparation for 
.iicgedly illegal practices and which if suc-
cessful would require that new rates be es-
tablished stated cause of action within pri-
mary and exclusive jurisdiction of Com-
merce Commission. 
Affirmed. 
f. Public Service Commissions <§=»7.l 
Jurisdiction of Commerce Commission 
- :o proceedings against a public utility to 
...over reparations for excessive charges 
> primary and exclusive. S.H.A. ch. 1112/$, 
ji§ 76-7$. 
2. Corporations C=»382«/2 
A common-law action will not origi-
nally lie at any time or under any circum-
stances for damages on account of exces-
-:ve rates allegedly charged by public utili-
ty. S.H.A. ch. III2/3, §§76-78. 
3. Public Service Commissions <3=>I9(2) 
Equity will not take jurisdiction of an 
:X:K>:: in which collateral attack is made 
< •• order oi Commerce Commission as to 
allegedly excessive rates charged by public 
••itility. S.H.A. ch. III2/3, §§ 76-78. 
4. Telecommunications €=337 
Where complaint, in action brought by 
plaintiff alleging that telephone company's 
policy and practice of providing services 
for personal use of current, former and re-
tired officers, directors and employees ei-
ther without charge or at less than estab-
lished rates violated Public Utilities Act, 
•••ii< not for penalties but was for refunds 
'•> damages or reparation for alleged ille-
gal practices, and would, if successful, re-
4uirc that new rates be established, com-
plaint did not state cause of action which 
could be commenced originally in circuit 
court but stated cause of action within pri-
mary and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Commerce Commission. S.H.A. ch. 111^ , 
§§ 37-39, 76-78. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure <S»229 
Party aggrieved by administrative ac-
tion ordinarily cannot seek review in 
courts without first pursuing all adminis-
trative remedies available to him; how-
ever, equitable relief is available if remedy 
at law is inadequate. 
6. Telecommunications <3=»337 
Appellate Court would not assume that 
Commerce Commission's decision, in re-
spect to plaintiff's allegation that telephone 
company's policy and practice of providing 
services for personal use of current, form-
er and retired officers, directors and em-
ployees either without charge or at less 
than established rates violated Public Utili-
ties Act, would be against plaintiff or that, 
if unsuccessful, appeal would not eventual-
ly result in a different decision, or that in 
any event public interest would suffer 
through loss or probable loss of service, 
and thus plaintiff was required to exhaust 
his remedies before Commission. S.H.A. 
ch. UI2/3, §§37-39,76-78. 
7. Equity <£=>! 
Commencement of class action does 
not automatically invoke jurisdiction of eq-
uity. 
8. Parties <§=>ll 
Since telephone subscribers are served 
by different exchanges with different 
classes of service and rates for varying 
periods of service, claim of each subscrib-
er, with respect to telephone company's al-
leged violation of Public Utilities Act over 
last 50 years, was legally separate and dis-
tinct and presented different question with 
respect to right of recovery and amount of 
alleged damages, and thus class action 
sought to be asserted by plaintiff in action 
alleging violation of Public Utilities Act 
1 0 0 I"- 340 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
did not have requisite common interest in 
question involved. 
9. Parties <§=>I0 
Where plaintiff had no individual 
cause of action, class action attempted to 
be asserted by plaintiff also failed. 
10. Telecommunications 0=337 
Allegation that if Commerce Commis-
sion took action in respect to telephone 
company's alleged violation of Public Utili-
ties Act, such action would be limited to 
one year even though alleged violations 
had persisted for over 50 years without in-
tervention by Commission, provided no ba-
sis for permitting plaintiff to maintain suit 
based on alleged violations in circuit court 
prior to exhaustion of remedies before 
Commerce Commission. S.H.A. ch. 111?4, 
§72. 
Donald H. Sharp, L. Bow Pritchett, Ed-
ward Butts, Chicago, for plaintiff-appel-
lant. 
Max Earl Sherman, Chicago, for defend-
ants-appellees. 
MEJDA, Justice. 
Plaintiff, Sol I. Dvorkin, individually 
and on behalf of a class, commenced an 
original action in the circuit court of Cook 
County for damages against defendants Il-
linois Bell Telephone Company and Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
The trial court granted the motion of Illi-
nois Bell to strike the complaint and dis-
miss the suit for want of jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff appeals. 
The sole issue for review is whether the 
instant complaint states a cause of action 
which may be commenced originally in the 
circuit court. We affirm. 
The complaint filed on April 28, 1972, by 
plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf 
of a class consisting of persons and corpo-
rations who have been subscribers, lessees, 
patrons and customers of Illinois Bell from 
the date the company first began the prac-
tice complained of was in two counts. 
Count I alleged that Illinois Bell had a pol-
icy and practice of providing services for 
the personal use of certain current, former 
and retired officers, directors, and em-
ployees of Illinois Bell either without 
charge or at less than the rate established 
and in force as shown by the schedule filed 
with the Illinois Commerce Commission, all 
in contravention and violation of sections 
37, 38 and 39 of the Illinois Public Utilities 
Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111^ , pars. 37, 
38 and 39); that as a direct result of the 
loss of revenue, plaintiff and the class are 
required to pay greater rates for services 
from Illinois Bell; and prayed that the 
practice be declared unlawful and en-
joined; and that judgment be entered 
against Illinois Bell for the lost revenue 
and punitive damages for the use and ben-
efit of the class, and other relief. Count 
II alleged that the illegal actions were with 
the knowledge, control, management, con-
nivance and complicity of American Tele-
phone by reason of its ownership of 99 per 
cent of the stock of Illinois Bell, and 
prayed judgment against American Tele-
phone for the losses and punitive damages 
to be paid to Illinois Bell for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff and the class, together 
with other relief. 
Section 37 of the Utilities Act prohibited 
a public utility from charging greater or 
less or different compensation than the 
rates specified in its schedules on file and 
in effect at the time "except such as are 
regularly and uniformly extended to all 
corporations and persons." An amendment 
effective October 1, 1972 (P.A. 77-2759) 
added a sentence: "No law of the State 
shall be construed to prohibit a public utili-
ty from furnishing its service, product or 
commodity to its employees, officers, direc-
tors or pensioners, or its employees, offi-
cers, directors or pensioners from receiv-
ing such service, product or commodity, 
free or at rates or charges less than those 
DVORKIN v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY 111. 1 0 1 
Cite as 340 N.B.2d 98 
specified in its filed schedules." (111.Rev. Commerce Commission. The pertinent 
Stat.1973, ch. 111^ , par. 37.) provisions of sections 72, 73 and 74 follow: 
Section 38 of the Act prohibits the 
granting of any preference or advantage 
and the establishment or maintenance of 
any unreasonable difference as to rates or 
other charges, services, facilities, or in any 
other respect, either as between localities 
or as between classes of service." Section 
39 further prohibits any utility, its officer, 
agents and employees, from directly or in-
directly permitting any corporation or per-
son "to obtain any service, commodity, or 
product at less than the rate or other 
charge then established and in force as 
shown by the schedules filed and in effect 
at the time." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111%, 
pars. 38 and 39.) 
The trial court, in the order granting Il-
linois Bell's motion to strike, found that 
the alleged discrimination is "necessarily so 
intertwined with establishment of rates or 
tariffs as to constitute rates or tariffs is-
Mie, rather than a question of discrimina-
tion per se," and that the exclusive juris-
diction for establishing rates and tariffs 
and for the recovery of refunds or repara-
tion for allegedly excessive charges is in 
the Illinois Commerce Commission. Since 
!>«> ruling was made as to American Tele-
phone, nor was the amendment to section 
{7 challenged in the trial court, neither 
\M11 hv considered. 
Plaintiff contends that in accordance 
with section 73 of the Illinois Public Utili-
ty* Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111%, par. 
' ' ) . a civil action may be commenced in 
*ny court of competent jurisdiction for the 
violation by a public utility of sections 37, 
*
W
 and 39 of the Act. Further, that the 
r<*'»ie<ly is cumulative under the provisions 
1,1
 ^-tn.ns 71 and 74 (pars. 76 and 78). 
I )c f
^<lant Illinois Bell, on the other hand, 
t o n ,emls that the complaint states a claim 
o r
 the recovery of refunds as reparation 
the A K ° V e r n e d b y s e c t i o n 7 2 (P a r- 76> o f 
for a n d t h a t t h e e x c l u s i v e jurisdiction 
r 8uch recovery is vested in the Illinois 
Sec. 72: "When complaint has been made 
to the Commission concerning any rate 
or other charge of any public utility 
and the Commission has found, after a 
hearing, that the public utility has 
charged an excessive or unjustly dis-
criminatory amount for its product, com-
modity or service, the Commission may 
order that the public utility make due 
reparation to the complainant therefor, 
with interest at the legal rate from the 
date of payment of such excessive or un-
justly discriminatory amount. 
* * * * * * 
' 'The remedy provided in this section 
shall be cumulative, and in addition to 
any other remedy or remedies in this Act 
provided in case of failure of a public 
utility to obey a rule, regulation, order 
or decision of the Commission, (par. 
76) 
Sec. 73: "In case any public utility shall 
do, cause to be done or permit to be 
done any act, matter or thing prohibited, 
forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or 
shall omit to do any act, matter or thing 
required to be done either by any provi-
sions of this Act or any rule, regulation, 
order or decision of the Commission, is-
sued under authority of this Act, such 
public utility shall be liable to the per-
sons or corporations affected thereby for 
all loss, damages or injury caused there-
by or resulting therefrom, and if the 
court shall find that the act or omission 
was wilful, the court may in addition to 
the actual damages, award damages for 
the sake of example and by the way of 
punishment. An action to recover for 
such loss, damage or injury may be 
brought in any court of competent juris-
diction by any person or corporation. 
"No recovery as in this section pro-
vided shall in any manner affect a re-
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lovery by the State of the penalties in 
fliis Act provided, (par. 77) 
S 8 . 74: 'This Act shall not have the ef-
fect to release or waive any right of ac-
tion by the State, the Commission, or by 
any body politic, municipal corporation, 
person or corporation for any right or 
pnalty which may have arisen or ac-
|ued or may hereafter arise or accrue 
33§ider any law of this State. 
Hjapi-
["All penalties accruing under this Act 
(all be cumulative of each other, and 
lit for the recovery of one penalty shall 
| t be a bar to or affect the recovery of 
ay other penalty or be a bar to any 
pminal prosecution against any public 
glity, or any officer, director, agent or 
jployee thereof, or any other corpora-
Jn or person." (par. 78) 
| his brief to this court, plaintiff states 
hhe cause was filed to enforce the 
discrimination provisions of the Illi-
| Public Utilities Act and to end the 
ling of free and reduced rate services 
iployees, management personnel, and 
| d employees, and for the return of 
pcSjtf charges levied against the public as 
nit of the failure of Illinois Bell and 
ijrent company to comply with the Act. 
~ 'Section 72 of the Act provides for the 
recogjery of reparations for excessive or 
uflpfiftly discriminatory amounts charged 
[itility when complaint has been made 
Illinois Commerce Commission. By 
\ms the remedy provided is curnula-
nd in addition to any other remedy or 
lies in the Act in case of failure of a 
pubiS| utility to obey a rule, regulation, or-
der or decision of the Commission. Sec-
tion 73 of the Act provides for the recov-
ery of civil damages for loss, damages or 
injury caused by or resulting from any act 
or omission contrary to any provision of 
the Act or of the Commission. Such ac-
tion may be brought in am court of com-
petent jurisdiction for consequential dam-
ages as distinguished from a claim for rep-
aration. (See Malloy v. III. Bell Tele-
phone Co. (1973), 12' Ill.App.3d 483, 299 
N.E.2d 517.) Section 74 of the Act, con-
sistently with the provisions of sections 72 
and 73, provides that the Act shall not re-
lease or waive any right of action for any 
right or penalty. The provision as to cu-
mulative rights is confined to penalties and 
suits for recovery of penalty. This latter 
provision is inapplicable to actions for the 
recovery of damages or reparations. The 
action herein is not for penalties, but rath-
er, for a refund as damages or reparations 
for the allegedly illegal practice. 
[1] The Illinois courts have uniformly 
held that the jurisdiction of the Illinois 
Commerce Commission as to proceedings 
against a public utility to recover repara-
tions for excessive charges is primary and 
exclusive. See Terminal R.R. Assn. v. 
Utilities Com. (1922), 304 111. 312, 317, 136 
N.E. 797; C.NS. & M.R.R. Co. v. City of 
Chicago (1928), 331 111. 360, 163 N.E. 141; 
Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. III. Cent. 
R. Co. (1936), 287 Ill.App. 549, 5 N.E.2d 
782; Adler v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. 
(1965), 57 Ill.App.2d 210, 206 X.E.2d 816; 
Cummings v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 
(1965), 64 Ill.App.2d 320, 213 N.E.2d 18; 
and Malloy v. III. Bell Telephone Co. 
(1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 483, 299 X.E.2d 517. 
[2,3] A common-law action will not 
originally lie "at any time or under any 
circumstances" for damages on account of 
excessive rates. (Medusa Portland Cement 
Co., supra, 287 Ill.App. page 565, 5 N.E.2d 
page 789.) Equity will not take jurisdic-
tion of an action in which collateral attack 
is made on the order of the Commission. 
C.N.S. & M.R.R. Co., supra, 331 111. page 
375, 163 N.E. 141. 
In Cotton v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 
(1953), 349 Ill.App. 490, 111 N.E.2d 363, in 
affirming the dismissal of a class action 
for injunctive relief which alleged that a 
revision of rates deprived the class of con-
stitutional rights, the court held that if the 
legal remedy consists in part of proceed-
ings before an administrative agency, equi-
ty should decline jurisdiction; that the 
Public Utilities Act has superseded all 
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common-law remedies so far as rates are 
concerned; that the statutory remedies af-
forded consumers under the Act are exclu-
sive ; that the rate filed with the Commis-
sion by a utility is presumed to be lawful; 
that the complaint must be made in the 
first instance before the Commission; and 
that the courts do not have jurisdiction to 
fix rates. 
In Burke r . Illinois Bell Tel Co. (1952), 
348 Ill.App. 529, 109 N.E.2d 358, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of a class action 
which sought a refund for defendant's fail-
ure to publish telephone directories semian-
nually. In holding that the trial court did 
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
the court found that the gist of plaintiff's 
claim was for reparations within the mean-
ing of section 72 and not for consequential 
or actual damages under section 73 as con-
tended by the plaintiff. 
In the recent case of Afalloy v. III. Bell 
Telephone Co., supra, a class action com-
plaint was filed against Illinois Bell in the 
circuit court which sought a refund for a 
six-day period during which electric serv-
ice had been disrupted by vandalism. 
There, as in the instant case, plaintiff relied 
on section 74 in maintaining that the claim 
was within section 73 and not section 72. 
The court rejected the argument and af-
firmed the dismissal of the complaint, con-
cluding that the claim was for reparations 
under section 72 and not for consequential 
damages, and that the Illinois Commerce 
Commission therefore had exclusive juris-
diction. 
Plaintiff here, as did the plaintiff in 
Malloy, cites Barry v. Commonwealth Edi-
son Co. (1940), 374 111. 473, 29 N.E.2d 
1014. In Barry, plaintiff initially filed a 
Petition before the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission for reparations which alleged that 
, ]
' t utility wrongfully accused him of un-
•»vw'ully i y-passing the meter and taking 
electricity, and wrongfully disconnected 
y mice and refused restoration until he 
J*aid $800, the estimated amount of current 
*
lleKed to have been taken by fraud. 
'femtiff prayed to be exonerated of the 
unjust charges of fraud and the return of 
the excess payment, which demand was re-
duced to $697 on hearing. The Commis-
sion refused to determine whether the cur-
rent was obtained by fraud, and ordered 
that the petition be dismissed and the par-
ties left to their respective remedies at law. 
Plaintiff Barry then ::led a complaint in 
court, not as a review of the Commission's 
order but as a new action. The first two 
counts alleged the foregoing charges, and 
additionally, that plaintiff was willing to 
pay any amount due, and sought damages 
for a wrongful disconnection of service 
and for the loss of business thereby sus-
tained. The third count alleged that 
agents of the utility charged plaintiff with 
being a thief by stealing current, and 
therein sought damages for slander. The 
only issue presented was whether the prior 
determination by the Commission was a 
bar to the action at law. The Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal 
and held that the action was not barred. 
The Court stated that the finding by the 
Commission as to reparations involved a 
claim for the repayment of specific money 
collected in excess of the legal rate, where-
as the action at law involved a claim for 
unliquidated damages to plaintiff, his busi-
ness, and for slander resulting from the 
utility's abuse of power. Barry supports 
the dismissal in the instar.t case. 
[4] Plaintiff argues that the instant ac-
tion is brought to enforce the anti-discrim-
ination provisions of the Illinois Public 
Utilities Act and that plaintiff and the 
class have been and are required to pay 
greater rates and charges than they would 
if the practice of granting services without 
charge or at reduced rates by Illinois Bell 
had not been permitted. Plaintiff seeks 
"the return of excess charges." Under 
somewhat similar fact*, in Cummings : . 
Commonwealth Edis.r. Cv. <1965», 64 ill. 
App.2d 320, 324, 213 X.E.2d 18, 21, the 
court stated: 
"It is apparent that the sole basis for 
plaintiffs claim, irrespective oi the label 
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she chooses to employ, is that she and 
other customers were charged excessive 
rates for which she wants reparations. 
The fact that plaintiff does not seek to 
upset a rate schedule or fix utility rates 
for the future does not bring this matter 
within the powers of a court of equity 
and outside the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Illinois Commerce Commission." 
Although the complaint in the instant 
case prays for such exemplary and punitive 
damages as may be found proper, it ad-
dresses itself to the proposition that if Illi-
nois Bell had not given discounted services 
to some of its employees, plaintiffs rates 
would have been lower, and that Illinois 
Bell should be required to repay, account 
for, refund or credit plaintiff and the class 
the appropriate loss suffered as a result of 
the allegedly unlawful practice. This is 
necessarily predicated upon the allegedly 
"excess charges" and therefore, upon the 
excessive rates to plaintiff and the class, 
and simultaneously, upon the inadequate 
charges or rates to the employees and offi-
cers. Plaintiff, in order to obtain a return 
of the portion of the charges paid by the 
class as excess—clearly reparations as pro-
vided in section 72—seeks to reduce the 
rates paid by him and the class by elimi-
nating the practice of discounted services 
to provide the additional revenues neces-
sary to effect such reduction. If the prac-
tice is so eliminated and the present rate is 
held excessive as alleged, a new rate must 
then be established, based on the new reve-
nues, and applicable to the class as well as 
the employees and officers. This would 
require the court to undertake the function 
of the Commission by fixing what would 
be considered a reasonable charge if the 
concession services had not been granted. 
This would further, involve rate-making by 
the court. The statutory remedies and 
procedures prescribed by the Illinois Public 
Utilities Act are primary and exclusive; 
the court does not have jurisdiction to fix 
the rates. See Colton v. Commonwealth 
Edison Co., supra. 
Plaintiff further contends that without 
court action the plaintiff class has no ade-
quate remedy at law. He argues that the 
practice of giving reduced rates and free 
services dates back to General Order 18 is-
sued by the Commission in 1914; that the 
Commission, during a certain rate case, re-
jected the contention that Illinois Bell was 
acting improperly in providing such free 
and reduced rate service to employees; 
and that in view of the Commission's will-
ingness for more than 58 years to permit 
such practice, contrary to the Act, further 
resort to the Commission for relief is pat-
ently useless. 
The rate case to which plaintiff refers 
ultimately reached the Illinois Supreme 
Court in ///. Bell Tel. Co. r. Commerce 
Com. (1973), 55 I11.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364. 
On September 2\ 1971, Illinois Bell filed 
with the Illinois Commerce Commission 
new tariff schedules that provided for a 
general increase in telephone rates applica-
ble to all exchanges. The matter was 
there pending when the instant suit was 
filed on April 28, 1972. Numerous munici-
palities, persons, organizations and groups 
filed appearances. On August 11, 1972, 
the Commission entered an order granting 
the rate increases. The order contained 
findings which specifically included a re-
cital that the Independent Voters of Illinois 
[IVI] proposed several adjustments to 
both Revenue and Expenses. The order 
recited: 'They advocate the elimination of 
free service and reduced rates for Compa-
ny employees and pensioners; the elimina-
tion of virtually all advertising, public rela-
tions, and charitable contribution expenses 
of all types and descriptions;" and that 
"An examination of the Record does not 
substantiate the sums for which the IVI 
contended adjustments should be made." 
The order specifically considered the items 
of advertising, public relations, and chari-
table contributions, but did not further 
mention the elimination of free service and 
reduced rates. The order did, however, 
provide that any objections and motions 
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made in the proceedings that remained 
were disposed of in a manner consistent 
with the ultimate conclusions contained 
therein. Following a petition for rehear-
ing, an appeal was taken to the circuit 
court and later to the Supreme Court as 
provided by section 68 (Ill.Rev.Stat.l°71, 
ch. 111?4 par. 72). The Commission or-
der was affirmed by the circuit court. On 
the appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 
the contention that it was error to refuse 
to disallow the concession service rates as 
an operating expense was abandoned and 
not considered. Plaintiff Dvorkin did not 
seek to intervene or participate in such 
proceeding at any time, as authorized by 
statute (IlLRev.Stat.1971, ch. 111#, par. 
69), but has instead brought the instant ac-
tion in equity. 
Plaintiff maintains that the Commis-
sion's willingness, for more than 5S years, 
to permit the practice makes further resort 
to the Commission for relief patently use-
less. In Adler v. Northern Illinois Gas 
Co., supra, a class action was brought on 
behalf of all customers of the utility for a 
declaratory judgment and accounting, 
alleging that the utility had fraudulently 
enriched itself through the sale of natural 
ws to its customers. The complaint, simi-
lar to the contention herein, alleged that 
plaintiff had properly filed no complaint 
with the Illinois Commerce Commission be-
«'au*e " '50 years of history of Illinois utili-
ty regulation apparently discloses no 
precedent for lower rates obtained by indi-
vidual consumers against large utilities, 
^"ch remedy has become largely a fiction 
«»r illusion.' " (57 Ill.App.2d 214, 206 X.E. 
-M S17) The allegations there were insuf-
f cient to avoid the primary jurisdiction of 
the Commission. The court held that the 
complaint, although alleging fraud, did not 
present a cause of action for court pro-
ceedings until the prescribed statutory pro-
c u r e s were exhausted. 
1 li
"!'tiff argues that he should not be re-
'I'sirvu to engage in administrative proceed-
*
nKs where the dispute is limited to a pure-
340 N.E 2d—7Va 
ly legal issue and where the outcome is 
predictable and the result foredoomed. 
This argument was approved in People ex 
rel. Naught on v. Dept. of Public Aid 
(1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 43, 297 N.E.2d 7S4; 
however, the decision was reversed in Peo-
ple ex rel. Naughton v. Swank (1974), 58 
I11.2d 95, 317 N.E.2d 499. The Supreme 
Court held that an applicant for relief who 
is dissatisfied with the results of his inter-
nal administrative appeal may not ignore 
the administrative review provided by stat-
ute to pursue a review of the determina-
tion by any form of action he chooses. 
The court stated at pages 101-102, 317 N. 
E.2d at page 503 that the legislative pur-
pose "was designed to channel into a single 
procedure the judicial review of the deci-
sions made by administrative agencies in 
particular cases." In the instant case, 
plaintiff seeks relief by original proceed-
ings in equity without first taking any ac-
tion before the Commission for the re-
quested remedy. 
[5,6] The doctrine of exhaustion has 
long been a basic principle of administra-
tive law, and a party aggrieved by admin-
istrative action ordinarily cannot seek re-
view in the courts without first pursuing 
all administrative remedies available to 
him; howe/er, exceptions recognize the 
rule that equitable relief will be available 
if the remedy at law is inadequate. (See 
///. Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 
60 I11.2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737.) Here, 
plaintiff would presume not only that the 
Commission will decide against him, but 
also that any appeal by administrative re-
view to the trial and appellate courts will 
not provide appropriate relief. The avoid-
ance of a prior administrative decision 
would severely undermine the legislative 
purpose manifest in providing a statutory 
review. We cannot assume that the Com-
mission's decision will be against plaintiff 
or that if unsuccessful, appeal will not 
eventually result in a different decision, or 
that in any event, the public interest will 
suffer through loss or probable loss of 
service. City of IVheaton v. Chicago, A. 
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& E. Ry. Co. (1954), 3 Ill.App.2d 29, 37, 
120 N.E.2d 370. 
[7-9] Plaintiff also argues that the 
Commission has no jurisdiction to enter-
tain class actions and that the inherent 
powers of a court of equity are needed to 
provide redress. The commencement of 
a class action does not automatically invoke 
the jurisdiction of equity. The instant 
proceeding was brought on "behalf of all 
other persons . . who have been 
subscribers . . . from the date upon 
which said company first began its unlaw-
ful practice/' Damages are claimed and 
sought for those who were and are now 
subscribers. This, plaintiff clearly cannot 
do. As noted in Burke v. Illinois Bell Tel. 
Co., supra, 348 Ill.App. at pages 536 and 
537, 109 N.E.2d at page 362, " . . . 
subscribers are served by different ex-
changes with different classes of service 
and rates for varying periods of service"; 
the claim of each subscriber is legally sepa-
rate and distinct. Each claim presents a 
different question with respect to the right 
of recovery and the amount of alleged dam-
ages. The class action herein does not have 
the requisite common interest in the ques-
tions involved. (See Hagerty v. General 
Motors Corp. (1974), 59 I11.2d 52, 57-59, 
319 N.E.2d 5.) Furthermore, since we have 
held that plaintiff has no individual cause 
of action, it necessarily follows that any at-
tempted class action must also fail. Zelick-
man v. Bell Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n 
(1973), 13 Ill.App.3d 578, 587, 301 N.E.2d 
47; DePhillips v. Mortgage Associates 
(1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 759, 7<M, 291 N.E.2d 
329. 
[10] Plaintiff finally contends, without 
citation of any authority, that if the Com-
mission were to take action, the recovery 
would be limited to a period of one year 
under section 72 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 
l l l^ j , par. 76), and that it makes no sense 
to restrict the plaintiff class to such limita-
tion where the alleged violations have per-
sisted over 50 years without intervention 
by the Commission. The contention is 
without merit. 
For the foregoing reasons the order of 
the circuit court of Cook County dismiss-
ing plaintiff's complaint is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
DEMPSEY and McNAMARA, JJ., con-
cur. 
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CHICAGO T ITLE AND TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee and Appellant 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Jack WALSH et al., Defendants-Appellants 
and Appellees and Cross-Appellees. 
Gale L. MARCUS and Max Munsen et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Appellees 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
CHICAGO T ITLE AND TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellee and Appellant 
and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 59504. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Third Division. 
Nov. 20, 1975. 
A title and trust company filed an 
action to prohibit the negotiation of drafts 
it issued as escrow agent to numerous 
creditors of the person who funded the 
escrow, and the action was consolidated 
with an action for declaratory judgment 
filed on behalf of some of the creditors, 
in which they sought payment of the drafts 
and damages sustained in reliance on them. 
The Circuit Court, Cook County, Francis 
T. Delaney, J., ordered rescission of the 
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thereof, or any county, city and county, municipality, or other body politic 
and the public utility affected may be interested, whether arising under the 
provisions of articles 1 to 13 of this title, or otherwise, and such findings, 
when so introduced, shall be conclusive evidence of the facts therein stated 
as of the date therein stated under conditions then existing and such facts 
can only be controverted by showing a subsequent change in conditions bear-
ing upon the facts therein determined. The commission, from time to time, 
may cause further hearings and investigations to be had for the purpose of 
making revaluations or ascertaining the value of any betterments, improve-
ments, additions, or extensions made by any public utility subsequent to any 
prior hearing or investigation, and may examine into all matters which may 
change, modify, or affect any finding of fact previously made, and at such 
time may make findings of fact supplementary to those theretofore made. 
Such hearings shall be had upon the same notice and be conducted in the 
same manner, and the findings so made shall have the same force and effect 
as is provided for such original notice, hearing, and findings. Such findings 
made at such supplemental hearings or investigations shall be considered in 
connection with and as a part of the original findings except insofar as such 
supplemental findings shall change or modify the findings made at the original 
hearing or investigation. 
Source: L. 13, p. 501, § 55; C. L. § 2964: CSA, C. 137, § 55; CRS 53, 
§ 115-6-18: C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-18: L. 69, p. 952, § 50. 
Am. Jur.2d. See 64 Am. Jur.2d, Public Utili- C.J.S. See 73B C.J.S.. Public Utilities, § 80. 
ties. § § 232. 268. 273, 279, 286. 
40-6-119. Excess charges - reparation - actions - limitation. (1) When com-
plaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate, fare, toll, rental, 
or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service performed by 
any public utility and the commission has found, after investigation, that the 
public utility has charged an excessive or discriminatory amount for such 
product, commodity, or service, the commission may order that the public 
utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from 
the date of collection, provided no discrimination will result from such 
reparation. 
(2) If the public utility does not comply with the order for the payment 
of reparation within the specified time in such order, suit may be instituted 
in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the same. All complaints 
concerning excessive or discriminatory charges shall be filed with the com-
mission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and the 
petition for the enforcement of the order shall be filed in the court within 
one year from the date of the order of the commission. The remedy provided 
in this section shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy in 
articles 1 to 7 of this title provided in case of failure of a public utility to 
obc\ the order or decision of the commission. 
Source: L. 13. p. 502, 8 56: C. L. 8 2965: CSA, C. 137, § 56: CRS 53, 
8 115-6-19: C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-19. 
S3 Hearings and Investigations 40-6-120 
Am. Jur.2d. See 64 Am. Jur.2d, Public Utili- Tariff on file, if unreasonable, is no answer 
tics $ § 58. 59, 275. to the shipper's demand for reparation. Bonfils 
CJ .S . See "^B C.J.S.. Public Utilities, v. Public Util. Comm'n. 67 Colo. 563. 189 P. 
* § 46-49. 775(1920). 
A railway company exacting an unreasonable Subsection (2) of this section is to be so con-
charge for its service must make reparation to strued as to have a prospective effect only. 
Ihe extent of the excess. Bonfils v. Public Util. Bonfils v. Public Util. Comm'n. 67 Colo. 56?. 
( omm'n. 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920). 189 P. 775 (1920). 
40-6-120. Temporary authority. (1) To enable the provision of carrier 
service for which there appears to be an immediate and urgent need to any 
point or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such 
need, the commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other 
proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier 
or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. Such temporary 
authority, unless suspended or revoked for good cause, shall be valid for 
such time as the commission specifies, but for not more than an aggregate 
of one hundred eighty days, unless for good cause shown the commission 
extends such temporary authority for a period of time which may extend 
until a final administrative decision is rendered, and shall create no presump-
tion that corresponding permanent authority will be granted thereafter. 
(2) Pending the determination of an application filed with the commission 
for approval of acquisition of stock of a carrier, or of a consolidation or 
merger of two or more carriers, or of a purchase, lease, or contract to operate 
the properties of one or more carriers, the commission may, in its discretion 
and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary approval for a 
period not exceeding one hundred eighty days for the operation of the carrier 
or carrier properties sought to be acquired by the person proposing in such 
pending application to acquire such properties or stock, if it appears that fail-
ure to grant such temporary approval may result in destruction of or injur\ 
to such carrier or carrier properties sought to be acquired, or to interfere 
substantially with their future usefulness in the performance of adequate and 
continuous service to the public. Temporary approval shall create no pre-
sumption that the application will be granted thereafter. 
(3) Transportation service rendered under such temporary authority or 
approval is subject to all applicable provisions of articles 1 to 13 of this title 
and to the rules, regulations, and requirements of the commission thereunder. 
The maximum time period of any temporary authority or approval shall not 
be extended or renewed under the provisions of article 4 of title 24. C.R.S.. 
or otherwise. 
(4) No temporary authority or approval may be issued by the commission 
unless, under such general rules as the commission may prescribe governing 
the application therefor and notice thereof to interested or affected carriers, 
any such interested or affected carrier has been given five days' notice of 
the filing of the application and afforded an opportunity to protest the grant-
ing thereof. If the commission is of the opinion that an emergency exists. 
it may issue temporary authority or approval at once by making specific refer-
ence in its order to the circumstances constituting the emergency, in which 
case no notice need be given, but any such emergency authority or approval 
shall expire no later than fifteen days after it was issued. 
Source: L. 69. p. 953. § 51; C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-20: L. 79. p. 1516. § 1: 
L. 83. p. 1563. § I. 
